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 ABSTRACT 
The Theory of the Firm, The Theory of Competition, 
 and The Transnational Corporation (TNC)  
 
 JEL F23 
 
Coase’s 1937 paper on “The Nature of the Firm” formed the basis 
of the transaction-cost and internalization theories of 
transnational enterprises in the 1970s-1990s.  These emphasized 
the problem of firms transferring intangible assets across 
national borders.  Newer theories of the firm adopt resource-
based Penrosian, knowledge-based, capabilities and evolutionary 
perspectives, yet most continue to explain the international firm 
as a function of transaction-cost economizing. It is argued that 
Coase’s intention was to present a theory of the firm abstracted 
from its competitive environment.  The application of this 
approach to a theory of the TNC is flawed because it cannot 
explain the TNC without reference to competitive conditions.  
This leaves us with incomplete theories of multinational firms in 
their competitive environments, because they address transaction-
cost problems and solutions to the exclusion of many other 
competitive considerations that must influence the transnational 
step in the firm’s evolution.  The newer knowledge-based theories 
of the firm represent progress because they focus on the 
institutional details of dynamic firm creation of (investment in) 
the intangible or knowledge-based competitive assets by which 
firms transform their environments.  For international firms, 
this has global consequences.  Most recently, theory has begun to 
emphasize the advantages and not just the costs of 
internationalization.  Additionally, the necessity to address the 
juxtaposition of internalization and externalization by global 
firms provides a context for creating a dynamic explanation of 
both.  The key is to recognize the process of standardization as 
a part of the process of innovation at the heart of learning-
based theories.  This can help to explain the hierarchical 
division of labor both within and between firms.  
 3
 
 
 
 
DRAFT 
 
 
The Theory of the Firm, The Theory of Competition, 
and The Transnational Corporation  
 
     The theory of the firmi, whether based on transaction-cost 
or on evolutionary and knowledge-based analysis, has provided the 
basis for constructing most of the theoretical treatments of the 
transnational corporation (TNC)ii since at least 1960.  This 
practice has had the result too often of focusing attention on a 
narrow set of parameters for defining and explaining the 
international firm. The parameters examined usually explain how 
global efficiency is improved through the international firm’s 
ownership and direction of productive assets in more than one 
country.  Both transactions-cost economics (TCE) and evolutionary 
theories of the firm have added immeasurably to the understanding 
of the multinational corporation, but the focus often excludes 
the analysis of business strategy and how firms compete to 
transform themselves and their environments in order to continue 
their productive operations successfully. 
 It is argued here that the theory of the firm initiated in 
Coase’s 1937 paper was an attempt to explain the functions of a 
firm abstracted from its competitive environment.  Coase’s 
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explanation was based upon the comparative efficiencies of 
coordinating resource allocation within a private profit-seeking 
hierarchical institution or through markets.iii  When transaction-
cost analysis was later extended to provide a theory of the TNC, 
especially during the 1950s to 1980s, Coase’s methodology was 
largely adopted, but inappropriately, it is argued here.  The 
evolutionary and knowledge-based theories of the firm that became 
more prominent in the 1980s to the present created a more complex 
and dynamic picture of the functions of the firm, but mostly 
retained transaction-cost reasoning to explain the TNC until very 
recently. 
          The purpose of this paper is not to deny that 
transaction costs can be one among many explanations for foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  The development of the concept has 
provided a great service in contributing to the analysis of the 
TNC and in generating a large literature devoted to the 
organization and activities of the firm and the TNC.  The view 
presented here is that transaction-cost-based theories provide an 
insufficient theoretical platform for explaining the 
multinational enterprise.  The knowledge- or learning-based 
theories present a more fitting approach to the extent that they 
abandon the excessively narrow focus on the transaction costs of 
transferring knowledge assets to foreign productive operations.  
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Recent work places more emphasis on the advantages to be obtained 
by international production and less on its costs.  A dynamic 
method that abandons the static, constrained-optimization 
approach emphasizes the extent to which firms’ investments are 
undertaken to transform their environments, including any 
constraints such as transaction costs, but more broadly as well. 
 In the case of international production, this takes on global 
consequences.  The need to address the simultaneous 
externalization of some productive operations and increasing 
concentration of resources inside global firms presents the 
opportunity to further develop the theory of competition by 
recognizing the process of standardization as a part of the 
process of innovation.  It also highlights the necessity of 
focusing more attention on the TNC’s control over resources 
outside its ownership boundaries through sub-contracting, 
outsourcing and other contractual arrangements. Finally, 
understanding the connection between internalization and 
externalization helps to further develop the nature of the 
hierarchical division of labor within and between firms, a topic 
mostly absent from the theory of the firm and the TNC.   
     The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section I 
briefly recaps the methodology of Coase’s 1937 theory of the 
firm.  Sections II and III review the extension of Coase’s theory 
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to analysis of the TNC by Hymer, Buckley & Casson, and 
Williamson.  Section IV develops the methodological error at the 
heart of a transaction-cost-based theory of the TNC.  Section V 
introduces the newer evolutionary, learning-based theories of the 
firm, most of which continue to explain the international firm as 
a product of transaction-cost economizing.  More recent 
literature examining the advantages of internationalized 
production and the juxtaposition of internalization and 
externalization by global firms provides a context for creating a 
dynamic explanation of both.  Concluding remarks appear in 
Section VI. 
 
I. COASE 
Ronald Coase’s 1937 paper on “The Nature of the Firm” was 
widely acclaimed in the 1970s through the 1990s as an 
institutionalist theory of the firm to replace the unsatisfactory 
neoclassical model described variously as a “black box” or a 
production function.   
Coase explained the firm as a superior institution for 
allocating productive resources when alloction through markets 
involves transaction costs.  Thus, the cost of market 
transactions with other agents can be reduced by forming a 
private group of individuals whose productive exchanges within 
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the group are governed by hierarchical instead of arm's-length 
relations.  The firm is said to "internalize" transactions that 
are more costly if arranged through markets.  However, as the 
firm grows through internalization, the costs of organizing 
transactions within the firm rise.  Therefore, the boundaries of 
the firm and the limit to firm size are determined by marginal 
analysis: 
At the margin, the costs of organizing  
within the firm will be equal either to  
the costs of organizing in another firm or  
to the costs involved in leaving the  
transaction to be "organized" by the price  
mechanism. ...This gives the equilibrium for  
static analysis [404]. 
Although Coase is critical of the neoclassical approach to 
the firm, here he places analysis of the firm squarely within the 
static, constrained optimization methodology of neoclassical 
economics.  This approach constitutes a theory of the firm 
abstracted from its competitive environment, since there could be 
any number of competitive reasons for a firm to extend its 
ownership boundaries, for example, the enlargement of its market 
share or exclusive control over scarce inputs.  Thus, we have a 
theory of the firm created at a higher level of abstraction than 
a theory of competition.  Application of this approach is widely 
adopted in the modern theory of multinational business. 
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III. TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE EARLY THEORY OF THE TNC: HYMER, 
BUCKLEY AND CASSON 
 
 In the early post-World War II period, Stephen Hymer 
(1976)iv and Charles Kindleberger (1969) fashioned an 
institutionalist treatment of the international firm that heavily 
influenced subsequent theory.  It is worthwhile here to review 
briefly Hymer’s framework, which was later split into the 
separate transactions-cost-economics (primarily associated with 
Oliver Williamson) and internalization (primarily associated with 
Buckley and Casson, and Dunning) approaches to the MNC. 
The research questions posed by Hymer were: (1) How does a 
firm engage in foreign production successfully, given the assumed 
competitive advantages of local firms in the host countryv  and 
(2) Why does a firm engage in foreign production instead of 
selling or licensing to a host-country firm the patent or 
technology or other asset underlying the final product it wishes 
to sell in the foreign country?  Note that, in posing this second 
question, Hymer assumed that TNCs exist to transfer usually 
intangible assets to a foreign production location.  This 
assumption has been maintained in most theories of the TNC, at 
least until very recently.  Hymer’s assumption was undoubtedly 
based on the observed transfer of new management techniques to 
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Europe by US multinationals during the post-World War II period. 
Typically, a manufacturing firm is assumed, although the same 
theories have been applied to FDI in services (Jones 2005: 
chapter 5). 
Hymer's answer to the first question was that some firms had 
developed "advantages" vis-a-vis other firms that would act to 
offset the location advantages enjoyed by local firms in the host 
country.  Such firm-specific advantages could include patents, 
better or cheaper access to important factors of production, 
brand names, economies of scale, and the like (Hymer 1976: 41-
46).  When these advantages were not easily acquired or imitated 
by local firms in the home or host country, the advantaged firm 
could profitably exploit its unique assets in a foreign country 
in competition with local firms.  Such advantages became known as 
“ownership advantages” in Dunning’s OLI paradigm (1993).vi  
Hymer's answer to the second question was that imperfections 
in markets lead firms in concentrated industries to engage in 
foreign production to achieve one or two goals primarily:  (1) to 
remove competition among enterprises located in different 
countries, and/or (2) to appropriate the maximum possible rents 
which could accrue to the firm's unique assets. 
In discussing why a firm wishing to maximize rents would 
choose foreign production over licensing, he referred to Coase's 
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theory of the firm, if not by name: 
Why does a firm use the advantage itself 
instead of licensing it?  ... The firm is a  
practical institutional device which substitutes  
for the market.  The firm internalizes or  
supersedes the market.  A fruitful approach to 
our problem is to ask why the market is an inferior 
method of exploiting the advantage; that is, we 
look at imperfections in the market [1976: 47-48]. 
For example, Hymer explained that uncertainty can lead to a 
"conflict of evaluations" between the owner of the advantage and 
the licensee: 
The owner of the advantage may use it  
himself because his evaluation of it is different  
from the evaluation of other people because 
he has more information about his advantage  
.... [1976: 50] 
Note that in Hymer’s hands, Coase’s metholology reappears, but  
the existence of the firm is now assumed, and the geographical 
extent of its boundaries is the focus.  In addition to the 
problem of asymmetric information, Hymer explained that 
uncertainty makes it difficult to construct a contract that 
satisfactorily anticipates and makes provision for unforeseen 
events (1976: 50). 
These examples anticipate the types of market failure giving 
rise to high contracting costs under transaction-cost-based 
theory developed in the 1970s.  But Hymer did not limit his 
discussion of market imperfections to the problem of contracting 
costs.  He also identified “imperfections” that could prevent the 
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advantaged firm from maximizing monopolistic/oligopolistic 
profits in a licensing situation: 
The second problem of licensing arises from 
the difficulty of controlling price and output. 
To achieve maximum profits, a firm which licenses 
must specify the precise use to each firm, and this  
is not always possible under the antitrust laws. 
Alternatively, it could let the firms compete, 
but this may result in a loss of profits.  If 
the firm which possesses the advantage does not 
license but instead undertakes the operations itself, 
there is less difficulty in achieving maximum 
profits [1976: 49]. 
Market imperfections here are defined from the point of view of 
the MNE, not from the perspective of economic efficiency.  Hymer 
noted also that licensing could lead to a loss or accelerated 
loss of the licensor's advantage to the licensee.  This danger 
could be forestalled by foregoing licensing in favor of foreign 
production.  The key point here is that Hymer predicted 
"internalization" of international exchanges of intermediate 
knowledge-based products for the purpose of reducing contracting 
costs, as well as for maintaining monopolistic or oligopolistic 
advantages and maximizing rents on the basis of barriers to 
entry.  Hymer’s focus on the transfer of assets from an MNC to 
its international affiliates, i.e., “internalization” as opposed 
to a transfer of assets through a market interface, has remained 
the focus of the theoretical analysis of the TNC’s primary 
function until very recently.    
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Hymer believed that the process of internationalization 
would lead to a smaller number of competing firms and thus a 
reduction in worldwide competition in the tradeoff between size 
of the firm and the number of firms.  At the same time, he 
believed that TNCs present the possibility of greater efficiency 
in the global transfer of technology, capital and organizational 
skills (Hymer 1976: 221; Hymer 1970).vii  In other words, Hymer's 
explanation of international production combined efficiency-
enhancing with efficiency-reducing factors.  While Coase’s 
influence is obvious, Hymer adds the competitive perspective of 
firms operating in oligopolistic industries.  Thus, Hymer’s 
theory of the TNC predicts that the extent of its geographic 
boundaries are affected by competitive considerations.  This is 
not a theory of the TNC abstracted from its competitive 
environment.  Coase’s ideas are adopted, but Hymer assumes that 
competitive conditions, and thus strategy, help to explain the 
international firm.   
Hymer’s dual approach (efficiency-enhancing and efficiency-
reducing) reappeared in Buckley and Casson’s (1976) development 
of an internalization theory of the TNC, presented as a special 
case of the multi-plant firm.  As in Hymer’s work, the focus is 
on the geographical ownership boundaries of the firm.  Buckley 
and Casson (B&C) did not mention “transaction costs,” but 
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referred to market imperfections that generate benefits from 
extending common ownership over several “interdependent 
activities linked by flows of intermediate products . . .,” 
crediting Coase (B&C 1976: 36, n. 2).  B&C listed several types 
of imperfection (from the firm’s perspective) that could be 
ameliorated by internalization, including (1) instances in which 
discriminatory pricing is not feasible (thus reducing 
possibilities for exploitation of market power); (2) bilateral 
concentration of market power; (3) asymmetric information 
regarding the nature or value of the product; and (4) barriers to 
trade or capital flows, and international variations in tax rates 
(pp. 37-38). 
This attention to both efficiency and market power 
considerations has continued to the present in contemporary 
internalization theory (e.g., Kay 1999) and in the work of 
international-trade theorists who address the MNE.  An example of 
the latter is Markusen (1995, 2002), who creates a model in which 
the advantaged firm becomes a multinational rather than a 
licensor when knowledge capital is easily appropriable by a 
licensee; the concern is with the loss of future rents from a 
proprietary-knowledge asset.  (See also Horstmann and Markusen 
1989.)  The internalization theory of the international firm is 
thus influenced by Coase, but does not address the TNC abstracted 
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from its competitive environment. 
 
III. WILIAMSON’S TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY 
OF THE TNC 
     Williamson’s theoretical work on the international firm 
(1975, 1981, 1985) is built on his transaction-cost-economics-
based explanation of the organization and boundaries of the M-
form corporation.viii  As applied to the TNC, the internalization 
of cross-border transactions takes place most likely in order to 
reduce transaction costs related to exchanges of intermediate 
products (especially intangible assets) across borders, thereby 
raising global efficiency.  Markets are the preferred method for 
transferring intangible assets to foreign locations, but costly 
market imperfections require the FDI approach.  Williamson 
responds to Hymer's work by agreeing (1981: 1561) that the firm 
could choose internalization in order to restrain competition in 
addition to or instead of promoting transactional efficiency.  
But he argues that the efficiency reason is the more compelling 
explanation because of the tendency for international production 
to take place in industries experiencing rapid technological 
progress, and because the markets for transferring knowledge pose 
such difficult problems.  He explicitly states that he has been 
dismayed by the popularity of the “antitrust” view that casts the 
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largest (including international) corporations in a negative 
light by assuming negative welfare consequences from their size 
and market share.      
 
According to Williamson, markets for technology/knowledge 
are imperfect due to three problems: "recognition, disclosure, 
and team organization" (1981: 1562).  His argument concentrates 
on the latter two.  The problem with disclosure arises in the 
transfer of technology due to the information asymmetry also 
recognized by Hymer.  The team organization problem arises when 
"new knowledge is diffusely distributed and is poorly defined": 
Where the requisite information is  
distributed among a number of individuals 
all of whom understand their speciality in 
only a tacit, intuitive way, a simple 
contract to transfer the technology cannot  
be devised [1981: 1562]. 
The disclosure problem would probably require a profit-
sharing arrangement with monitoring of costs and revenue, and 
perhaps monitoring of production.  The disclosure and team 
organization problems present the additional difficulty of 
establishing procedures to govern joint work by personnel from 
two firms.  If the contemplated transaction is of a recurring 
type, "complex contracting is apt to give way to direct foreign 
investment" (p. 1563).  Therefore, the more complex or new the 
technology, the higher are the expected external transaction 
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costs, and the more likely is the TNC solution.  The TNC is 
explained as a technological pioneer with efficiency-enhancing 
properties.   
Williamson supports his explanation of the TNC by citing 
some evidence that international firms tend to transfer new 
technology through FDI, but use licensing and joint ventures to 
transfer older technology (1981: 1563, n.41; see also Hennart 
1991: 88; Milberg 1998) However, this evidence would seem to be 
consistent with an oligopolistic competition explanation also.  
New technology is more likely to be the basis of current rent 
receipts and of the immediate competitive development of the firm 
(as developed in knowledge-based theories of the firm addressed 
below), and therefore is more important to guard from rivals.   
     Thus, Williamson’s TCE-based theory of the multinational 
firm follows Coase more closely than those of Hymer and B&C.  If 
the firm exists because it functions as a transaction-cost-
minimizing institution, then the TNC exists to perform the same 
function across national borders.  Williamson is certainly aware 
of competitive conditions that could influence firms’ decision-
making on many matters, including the choice of ownership of 
foreign productive assets.  Therefore, it can only be concluded 
that his attempt here is to fashion a theory of the TNC 
abstracted from its competitive environment, emulating Coase’s 
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1937 methodology of investigation of the firm in isolation from 
competition.   
 
Williamson cautioned that “a transaction cost 
interpretation” should not necessarily be construed as a “fully 
adequate” treatment of the subject (1981: 1557).  More recently, 
Williamson has suggested that TCE and evolutionary theories of 
the TNC be explored together.  Nevertheless, until recently, 
Williamson’s influential methodology has had the effect of 
focusing the MNE literature on transaction-cost-based 
explanations (Pitelis__).ix 
 
IV. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM, THE THEORY OF COMPETITION, AND THE 
TNC  
 Do we have a theory of the TNC abstracted from its 
competitive milieu?  Do we have a theory of the TNC embedded in 
its competitive context?  The argument here is that Hymer and 
Buckley & Casson offer the latter, essentially a theory of 
international competition carried on by oligopolistic firms with 
access to sufficient resources to contemplate ownership of 
foreign productive resources.  Williamson attempts to offer the 
former, following Coase’s methodology, but TCE alone cannot 
achieve this goal because it cannot explain the need or even 
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reason for a foreign production site. 
 As formulated, the transaction-cost-based theory of the TNC 
assumes that production in two countries is necessary, and then 
specifies the most likely form of the advantaged firm's 
involvement, i.e., licensing or FDI.  But this theory does not 
explain why the firm with the knowledge asset cannot simply 
export the product embodying the technology (Ietto-Gillies 1992: 
118).  In other words, why must the asset be transferred at all? 
 As Brainard (1997) observes, the desire or necessity for 
internal exploitation of the firm's assets leads to the 
possibility of FDI or of exports from the home country, with the 
latter presenting the possibility for economies of scale.  
In order to explain why foreign production is essential, 
resort must be made to strategic considerations with respect to 
location (Dunning 1998; Caves 1996: 2; Hennart 1991: 85), such as 
foreign laws, regulations or taxes (as recognized by B&C), or 
removal of foreign competition (recognized by Hymer), or 
advantages to be gained from the foreign location not available 
in the home country (Ietto-Gillies; Nolan), or any number of 
strategic reasons deriving from the firm's competitive stance in 
its industry and its access to resources.  It is not sufficient 
to simply assume the existence of import barriers, especially 
since in recent decades, international trade barriers have been 
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falling while multinational production has been growing (Ietto-
Gillies 2005:155; WIR 2005).   
John Dunning, the creator of the "OLI eclectic paradigm,"x 
laments that, in the TNC literature, location has become the 
"neglected factor." (Dunning 1998:45)  He argues that, "given 
[the firm's] O[wnership] specific advantages, the critical choice 
of a multi-activity firm is whether it should internalize its 
intermediate product markets within its home country or in a 
foreign country ..." (Dunning 1998: 45).  In fact, Brainard's 
(1997) empirical work finds that the ratio of firms' research and 
development expenditures to sales (an indication of technological 
intensity and the existence of technological intangible assets) 
explains exports slightly better than it explains foreign 
production.  In other words, the choice of the location of 
production must be explained.  
Again, Coase’s transaction-cost theory of the firm is an 
attempt to explain why the firm exists, and the ownership 
boundaries of the firm (Conner 1991: 123; Coase 1937; Williamson 
1981), based upon the relative costs of market and internal 
coordination of productive services.   As such, it is treated in 
abstraction from the goals and activities of the firm in the 
context of its competitive environment.  TCE theory, assuming the 
existence of the firm, nevertheless adopts Coase’s methodology to 
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explain the ownership boundaries of the international firm.  Like 
Coase, Williamson seems to treat the theory of the multinational 
firm in abstraction from its competitive environment.  This 
methodology does not ask how the TNC acquired the asset or 
advantage that gives rise to the transfer problem, nor does it 
ask how the firm's exploitation of its asset will affect other 
firms in the industry and its own competitive stance in the 
industry (Dunning 1993: 81).  Nor does it ask whether the firm's 
best competitive strategy against its rivals requires putting 
aside the problem of transaction costs in order to address 
another factor that will more effectively improve its overall 
competitive position (Cantwell 1991:25; Pessali 1999: 267).  But 
surely these factors affect the choice of production location.  
Knickerbocker (1973) found a tendency for firms operating within 
a loose oligopoly to follow the industry leader, setting up 
foreign subsidiaries in locations pioneered by the leader firm.  
This was portrayed as a defensive competitive strategy, adopted 
in order to avoid losing out on any advantages the leader might 
receive or create in the new location, but probably not cost—
effective, at least at the outset.  Vernon (1993: 59) argues that 
defensive competitive reasons, and not necessarily cost-conscious 
ones, explain much of the international production that has taken 
place since the end of the Second World War. 
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When the firm's competitive environment and strategic 
considerations are introduced, the inquiry has shifted from a 
theory of the firm to a theory of competition.  The difference 
between them is in the level of abstraction characteristic of 
each.  Specifically, the theory of the firm is treated at a 
higher level of abstraction than is the theory of competition.  
The theory of the firm represents an attempt to explain the 
features of the firm that permit low-cost resource allocation, 
while putting aside the effects of the competitive environment.  
Therefore, introducing the location decision to explain the 
existence of the international firm (which of necessity 
introduces the panoply of strategic competitive considerations) 
takes the inquiry out of the realm of the theory of the firm, and 
into the realm of the theory of competition.   
     Cantwell (1991: 17) describes the difference between the two 
as emanating from two different levels of analysis: the 
mesoeconomic (focusing on the interaction between firms in an 
industry) and microeconomic (focusing on the individual firm).  
The point made here is that the latter cannot serve as a theory 
of the TNC without reference to the former, because it cannot 
explain when production should take place in the home or foreign 
location.  Even if the location issue arises due to a non-
strategic factor such as trade barriers, which could affect all 
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foreign firms equally, each firm's response will depend upon its 
competitive environment. 
Once this broader competition question is introduced, it is 
clear that there are a number of reasons why a firm might choose 
international production, and that these reasons may have nothing 
to do with transaction costs, or may constitute considerations in 
addition to transaction costs.  TCE purports to explain common 
ownership of internationally dispersed productive assets, but 
another possible explanation is that the firm establishes a 
foreign subsidiary instead of a contractual relationship with a 
foreign firm because it wants to maintain a monopoly on its 
knowledge assets for as long as possible in order to garner the 
maximum possible rents, as is recognized by Hymer, B&C, and in 
most versions of “internalization” theory.  This motive for 
internalizing cross-border transactions is not based on 
coordination costs and is not necessarily consistent with 
improved efficiency.  
The problem with TCE as a theory of the international firm 
is that it explains only what it assumes, i.e., that the firm's 
motive in establishing foreign production is to economize on the 
cost of transferring assets.  By abstracting away from the 
factors that influence the decision about production location, 
Williamson attempts to explain the TNC on the basis of the 
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internal and external costs of coordinating resources only. 
Once consideration of location factors has led to the 
determination that foreign production instead of domestic 
production will more readily secure the firm's goals, it is 
possible to consider whether TCE explains the appropriate form or 
mode of the firm's relationship to the foreign production 
endeavor, i.e., ownership, licensing, joint venture, or other 
contractual form.  Here, TCE explains that, when the firm is to 
contribute costly-to-transfer assets to the foreign production, 
the method likely to economize on transaction costs is often FDI. 
 Yet there is a great deal of literature describing and 
explaining the recent growth of international joint ventures (Yan 
1998) and international networks of cooperating firms (Mutinelli 
and Piscitello 1998; Belussi and Arcangeli 1998; Nolan; Ietto-
Gillies).  A number of motives have been put forth to explain 
these alliances, including risk-sharing, cost-sharing, the 
growing importance of inter-sectoral technology, the search for 
new products, penetration of markets, and organizational learning 
opportunities (Hagedoorn 1996: 601-605; Belussi and Arcangeli 
1998), and not just the cost of the transfer of intangible 
assets.  To the extent that firms choose these cooperative forms, 
it must be the case that the expected gains to the firm's 
competitive position from risk-sharing or learning or etc. 
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outweigh the expected gains from minimizing transaction costs via 
internalization.   
That is, it is possible that firms choosing a cooperative 
form of international participation are pursuing goals other than 
the transfer of knowledge to a foreign production site, which is 
the goal analyzed by TCE analysis.  If so, then TCE explains the 
choice of the form of international involvement only in 
circumstances where the nature of markets for the transfer of 
knowledge constitutes the most important factor.  In other words, 
once again, TCE explains only what it assumes.  It contributes 
consideration of a factor in the multinational decision that 
might have been overlooked before TCE was developed, but it alone 
does not explain the choice.  The competitive position and goals 
of the firm, its access to resources and its strategies, and the 
managers' perceptions of these factors, do.  TCE provides one 
explanation among many for international production as is 
recognized in internalization theory.  It cannot stand alone as a 
theory of the TNC. 
In the discussion so far, TCE explains the TNC only given 
that the state of competition and the firm's resources require 
foreign production instead of export, and given that the ability 
to minimize transaction costs is the most important issue in the 
decision about how to exploit its assets in other countries.  Yet 
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even this limited role for TCE is overstated, once a dynamic 
concept of competition is introduced. 
  
V. Knowledge-based theories of the firm combined with 
transaction-cost theory of the TNC 
Hymer, Buckley & Casson, and Williamson crafted theories of 
the TNC that were very influential in the 1970s, 1980s and into 
the 1990s.  The 1990s and 2000s have marked the arrival of a new 
genre of theories aiming to augment or displace TCE and 
internalization theories of the firm and the TNC.  The newer 
theories include the resource-based view (RBV) (Kay), the 
competencies approach to both the firm and the TNC (Hodgson; 
Prahalad and Hamel), the evolutionary or knowledge-based theory 
of the TNC (Kogut and Zander), the theory of foreign 
technological accumulation (Cantwell), the theory of the 
innovative enterprise (Lazonick), and the theory of the TNC as a 
master of multiple national “regulatory regimes” (Ietto-Gillies). 
 For the most part, however, the knowledge theories of the firm 
leave intact the transaction-cost theory of the TNC.  This 
approach isn’t really challenged until very recently (see Ietto-
Gillies 2005; Nolan et al. 2002, both discussed below).xi 
By focusing on the internal impetus to firm growth based on 
the firm’s resources and ongoing collective learning, the 
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knowledge-based theories challenge a fundamental assumption 
underlying the theories relying on coordination costs: the 
assumption that markets are the preferred venue for transferring 
knowledge assets except for the costs associated with inter-firm 
relationships.  Treating knowledge assets as a strategic, 
competitive advantage in the fight for market share is ignored by 
the TCE-based theory because it ignores the creation of the 
ownership advantage:  Where did it come from? Or how was it 
developed?  WHAT DOES THE FIRM DO?  What do TNCs do? (Hodgson, 
1998:188; KZ 1993:638; B&C 1976:69)  In addition to allocating 
resources, they produce and sell goods and services and compete 
in order to be able to continue to do so on a remunerative basis. 
 In the newer theories, firm and MNE advantages are the results 
from past investments in R&D, in the creation of an integrated 
team of skilled individuals, the creation of an information 
transmission network within the organization, and the like.  The 
newer approaches have, not coincidentally, coincided with a new 
appreciation of Edith Penrose’s (1959) work on the internal 
impetus to growth of the firm. Her book had introduced 
cumulative, collective learning within the firm as an essential 
driver of the expansion of the firm and the path-dependent 
direction of expansion, including foreign production.   
The literature on competition on the basis of knowledge 
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assets identifies these assets not only as inputs into final 
products, but as the fundamental means of competition for the 
firm (Navaretti et al. 2004; Ietto-Gillies 2002; Cantwell 1989; 
Conner 1991).  That is, the ability to produce knowledge, and to 
continue that ability into the future, is treated as a 
competitive advantage and strategy of the firm.  This implies 
that knowledge assets are more likely to be exploited within the 
firm and not for sale, even if markets could deliver full rents 
and minimize transaction costs to the owners of the assets.  This 
is because internal development of know-how provides the means 
for developing knowledge assets in the future, and therefore 
secures a basis for successful competition in the future.  Edith 
Penrose's work on the growth of the firm emphasizes the 
development or evolution of the firm as it grows, within its 
competitive context.  This takes place on the basis of the 
special talents developed by the firm's personnel in the process 
of working with the firm's physical assets.  As Penrose 
emphasized, the acquisition of new knowledge or know-how opens 
new possibilities that didn’t exist or weren’t recognized in an 
earlier period.  The introduction of these dynamic competition 
concerns could explain Williamson's (1981: 1563, n.41) and 
Hennart's (1991: 88) observations, noted above, that new 
technology tends to be transferred through a foreign subsidiary, 
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while older technology is transferred via licensing or joint 
venture.  In the new approach to technological competition, the 
transaction cost problem is irrelevant or secondary to the goal 
of maintaining privileged access to unique competitive assets for 
further development.xii 
When considering knowledge-based competition, it is useful 
to think of the firm as a producer of joint products: the final 
product which it sells, and the learning or knowledge asset 
developed along with the final product that makes the product 
competitive against the products of rival firms and creates new 
competitive opportunities.  The knowledge product is not 
developed for sale, but for internal use, preparing the firm for 
the next stage of competition.  The firm is thus an evolving 
entity, reproducing itself from one period to the next, but 
enhanced or changed by the learning-cum-production of the 
previous period.  E. H. Chamberlin criticized the focus of IO 
economics of the 1950s-1960s on the industry as the unit of 
analysis, arguing that the "product" is constantly changing, 
making industry an inchoate concept (Ekelund and Hebert 1990).  
By extension, the plasticity of Chamberlin's concept of the 
"product" implies that the firm that is changing or developing 
its product is simultaneously changing itself. 
This dynamic competition approach challenges the assumption 
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at the heart of TCE/internalization theory that markets would be 
the preferred route for international transfer of assets but for 
market imperfections.  (Navaretti et al. 2004; Ietto-Gillies 
2002).  The function of the firm is to produce new unique 
collective knowledge that is difficult to copy and embodied in 
new products, processes, or new organizational routines, as the 
basis for competition and survival.  Hierarchy is not the only 
institutional difference between the firm and the market, nor is 
it the most important.  The focus switches from the transfer of 
knowledge assets to the production of knowledge assets.   
Although Penrose’s theory took into account both internal 
and external factors explaining the growth of the firm, the 
contribution that most influenced the knowledge-based theories 
was her explanation of the internal drivers of growth.  To 
Penrose, the firm is a “bundle of resources”(____) consisting of 
human beings and physical assets that provide productive 
services.  She argues that, since the interaction of the firm’s 
personnel with their capital equipment and materials over time 
leads to the production of new knowledge, understanding, and 
capabilities, this process in effect creates new unused services 
that can be obtained from existing resources, and can be put to 
profitable use.  But Penrose does not focus exclusively on the 
internal firm processes.  Rather, these internal developments 
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color management’s view regarding external opportunities, and 
vice versa.  This leads to new endeavors, and acquisition of 
additional resources as needed to pursue these new endeavors, 
eventually taking the firm into product and/or geographical 
diversification based upon the collective, cumulative learning 
taking place.  In Penrose, international production is an 
inevitable part of the growth of the firm that has mastered a 
competitive knowledge-based evolutionary path. Some of the 
Penrose-inspired theory of the firm and TNC is reviewed briefly 
below. 
(A) The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm has 
emerged as a potential alternative to the 
internalization/transaction-cost theories (Pitelis, et al. 
2000).  Like Penrose’s work, it emphasizes the firm’s 
activities as a path-dependent or path-influenced process 
of creation of knowledge based on the characteristics of 
the firm’s initial bundle of resources. (Wernerfelt 1984; 
Kay 2000). Kay (2000) suggests that RBV can be used to 
create a theory of the TNCxiii by weaving RBV with 
internalization theory.  Like Penrose, he treats the MNE as 
a bundle of resources, and groups these resources as 
intangible assets that the firm may possess in (1) 
marketing, (2) production, (3) R&D, and (4)home country-
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based knowledge.  He suggests that it is the strength or 
weakness an individual firm has in these areas that will 
determine the direction of new activities.  The direction 
of expansion is defined as a choice among (a) further 
product specialization, (b) product diversification, or (c) 
selling abroad.  In this approach, the richest resource 
linkages between the firm and its new activity are to be 
found in domestic expansion, based either on further 
specialization or diversification, since all four 
categories of intangible assets may be exploited more 
intensively.  Exporting is less desirable since the firm’s 
expertise in production and R&D only could be exploited.  
Presumably, its marketing and home country-based knowledge 
would not be useful.  Therefore, exporting is desirable 
only if there are limits to domestic expansion, such as 
market saturation or antitrust regulatory difficulties.  
The internationalization option is the least desirable, 
since the firm’s production assets could not be exploited, 
although its R&D advantages could.  Kay does not elaborate 
the factors that determine the choice between export and 
FDI.  He concludes that the RBV approach shows that 
multinational expansion is a solution deriving from a 
“weakened” home position for a firm that has no further 
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opportunities for domestic resource linkages.  And the firm 
has no justification for international expansion without 
strong research-based assets (151).  
According to Kay, once foreign production is chosen as the 
appropriate direction of expansion, the assumption of ownership 
of the foreign assets is dropped, and the question of the mode of 
expansion arises.  That is, the firm may also consider 
cooperative modes such as subcontracting, licensing, joint 
venture or franchise.  Here, says Kay,  
we have a ready-made tool kit for analyzing mode in the 
industrial organization literature, namely transaction cost 
economics….  This framework expresses choice of mode in 
comparative institutional terms and considers the 
efficiency implications of alternative market and 
organizational arrangements.” (154)(emphasis supplied)   
 
Thus, Kay embraces the coordination cost/efficiency approach to 
explain the internationalization step, and portrays this step as 
a last resort.  Kay adopts the broader approach to coordination 
costs found in the internalization literature, including 
appropriability issues, and concludes that both RBV and some form 
of internalization analysis are necessary to adequately analyze 
the expansion decision; RBV determines direction, and 
internalization analysis determines mode. 
Kay is clearly not trying to fashion a theory of the MNE 
abstracted from its competitive environment.  His RBV approach 
considers competitive factors with respect to direction of 
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expansion, and his broad internalization approach includes 
appropriability issues.  Therefore, on the question of why a firm 
OWNS foreign productive assets, which is the question that must 
be answered, Kay considers interfirm coordination costs.  The 
possibility that a host of other competitive/strategic issues may 
impact the mode choice, such as access to technology or methods 
or products, or risk-spreading or geographic location of rivals 
is not recognized.  Kay’s theory of the TNC within its 
competitive environment inexplicably gives pride of place among 
the determinants of FDI to coordination costs and the goal of 
efficiency with respect to this narrow category.  By focusing too 
intently on Penrose’s treatment of internal forces for expansion, 
Kay ignores the possibility of acquiring resources or other 
competitive advantages from another location.   
(B) The evolutionaryxiv theory of the TNC by Kogut and Zander 
(K&Z 1993, 2003) is critical of the importance assumed by 
transaction-cost/internalization approaches in the theory of the 
firm and the TNC.  K&Z variously refer to their work as a theory 
of the firm, theory of the growth of the firm, and a theory of 
the TNC.  They critique RBV and internalization theories; 
nevertheless, they combine some evolutionary and Penrosian 
resource-based ideas with an internalization approach. 
K&Z portray the firm as a social community assembled in 
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order to create and transform tacit collective knowledge into 
profitable goods and services.  The firm develops routines, codes 
and know-how in order to do so efficiently (631). K&Z argue 
(2003:10) that the firm’s advantage over the market does not 
involve transaction costs, but is composed of employee 
identification with the social group which enhances coordination, 
communication, and learning.  They distinguish their approach 
from RBV by criticizing the latter’s “excessively” inward focus 
on the likely direction of expansion, arguing that the evolution 
of resources will always be influenced by the external forces of 
market competition.   
For K&Z, the understanding and cooperation elicited from the 
firm’s personnel by identification with this social community 
creates the competitive or ownership advantages or capabilities 
secured by the firm.  These capabilities, of different strengths 
in different firms, make transfers within the firm less costly 
than interfirm transfers, due to investments in “codifying and 
teaching complex knowledge to recipients….” (630).  The MNC 
appears due to its superior efficiency vis-a-vis other firms in 
the (internalized) transfer and recombination of tacit knowledge 
across national borders (K&Z 1993: 625-27).  K&Z challenge the 
frequent assumption in the transaction-cost literature that there 
is a public good aspect of knowledge: i.e., that it can be 
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transferred at zero marginal cost, but hard to protect, such that 
market failure requires internalization (see, e.g. B&C: 628).  
Thus, their criticism of the B&C internalization approach is that 
all firms do not face the same transaction costs.  Furthermore, 
the issue created by the existence of transaction costs is not 
primarily the problem of choosing a governance mechanism (market 
vs. firm), but the different capabilities of individual firms for 
achieving routinized communication of difficult-to-transfer 
knowledge.  Therefore, the mode of transfer of knowledge, whether 
internal or external to the firm, depends on the unique 
capabilities created by each firm.xv   
This resembles an internalization approach, adding the 
recognition of different transaction costs facing individual 
firms based on their past investments and performances, and 
rejecting the Williamson emphasis on market failure and 
contracting problems.  K&Z provide a more detailed behavioral 
focus on production, i.e., transferring and transforming 
collective, tacit knowledge into profitable products and 
services.  The transfer of knowledge in this view is part of a 
stage of production in which ideas are made accessible to members 
of a group that will transform them into products.  Firms that 
are more efficient at this become MNEs because they are most 
likely to be able to do the same across national borders.  But 
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WHY can’t they export?  WHY do they have to locate production in 
the foreign market?   
K&Z go beyond the problems involved with asset transfer, and 
embrace a more holistic approach by, like Penrose, emphasizing 
that the firm’s problem is not just to transfer knowledge, but to 
use it as its platform for the creation of future advantages and 
expansion, i.e., as the basis for competition.  Further, as K&Z 
develop this point, they begin to refer to the role of the two-
way transfer of information that can result from opening 
operations in a foreign country, and thus open the discussion to 
a recognition too rare in the economics literature that FDI can 
take place in order to acquire advantages, and not just to 
transfer them from the parent firm.  According to K&Z, the 
acquisition and recombination of knowledge to create future 
competitive possibilities are less likely if the firm relies on 
licensing instead of foreign production (640).  Here, a reason 
for foreign production is introduced, although it is not clear 
why the acquisition of knowledge from abroad requires a 
production presence in a foreign country.  Implicitly, 
production-specific learning-by-doing is suggested.   
K&Z essentially present a theory of firm growth and 
development (like Penrose); when the firm arrives at the 
international step, which is assumed to be a negative function of 
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the attractiveness of domestic opportunities, it internalizes 
foreign production in order to transfer tacit assets to the 
foreign country and/or to acquire new capabilities.  But the 
other possible competitive reasons for international production 
are ignored.  
(C) Lazonick’s theory of the social conditions of innovative 
enterprise (SCIE) (2003; 2002) presents a theory of firm 
development that emulates, criticizes and extends Penrose’s work, 
but does not address the multinational firm.  Nevertheless, it is 
the approach to the firm that most successfully rejects 
transaction cost economics and the static, constrained 
optimization methodology underlying TCE.  Lazonick’s innovative 
firm does not passively respond to external constraints such as 
transaction costs. Instead, it acquires financial commitment to a 
process of innovation with an uncertain outcome in order to 
transform products, markets and technological and other 
“conditions that might otherwise impose constraints on its 
ability to generate higher quality, lower cost products.” (2002: 
251) 
[T]he transaction-cost approach…ultimately relies on 
exogenously determined “sunk costs” – Williamson’s “asset 
specificity” – to explain the scale and scope of the modern 
industrial enterprise.  …Instead of viewing the firm’s 
assets as exogenously determined, a theory of innovative 
enterprise analyses them as strategic investment. (P. 250) 
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But Lazonick’s criticism (and others’, e.g. Nolan et al. 
2002) make clear the fundamental limitations of the constrained 
optimization/comparative statics approach adopted by most of the 
extant theories.  For Lazonick, Schumpeterian innovation leading 
to transformation of the firm’s environment is the essence of 
competition.  Innovation creates an evolutionary development of 
the competitive environment, so that specific competitive 
challenges change over time.  By recognizing that the development 
of firm competitive assets transforms its environment, he more 
successfully converts the knowledge-based approach into a dynamic 
theory of competition and firm development over time. 
 The social conditions necessary to accomplish innovation, 
according to Lazonick, are organizational integration, financial 
commitment, and strategic control.  The organizational 
integration concept (similar to K&Z’s emphasis on the necessity 
for the creation of commitment to the enterprise by individuals) 
recognizes the need for incentives for individuals to engage in 
collective learning that will enable transformative action.  The 
financial commitment is necessary to finance the needed time for 
development, and strategic control is the power to allocate 
resources so as to achieve the firm’s innovative goals. (p. 252) 
Like Penrose, Lazonick recognizes that the firm’s cumulative 
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learning and development require not only the continual 
development of the firm’s resources, but also the necessity for 
complementary investments in new resources. (p. 271)  This means 
innovations or capabilities from outside the firm are added to 
the firm’s cumulative knowledge development.xvi 
 Penrose, Lazonick, and others have also recognized the 
“growing importance of strategic alliances and networks of firms 
in the innovation process,” requiring an inquiry into “the 
organizational learning and economic performance of…inter-firm 
alliances.” (271)  Lazonick notes “large literatures on supplier 
relations and strategic alliances… demonstrate that innovation 
can occur through cooperation across legally independent firms as 
well as within a firm….” (2003: 56) With this recognition, it 
seems that the RBV and evolutionary approaches to the firm to 
date constitute only special cases of a broader knowledge 
approach to intra-firm and inter-firm structures of learning, 
competition and cooperation.  This brings into question whether 
the long-standing focus on the ownership boundaries of the TNC is 
sufficient, given that the inquiry is about non-market 
institutional control over the allocation of some portion of 
global resources.  Lazonick himself does not extend his analysis 
to the TNC. 
(D) Nolan et al. (2002) and Ietto-Gillies (2002A, 2002B, 
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2005) address the TNC by abandoning the focus on the transfer of 
knowledge and transactions costs, and indeed on the theory of the 
firm, to introduce the idea that there are benefits deriving 
specifically from foreign operations.  In addition they address 
the growing practice of externalization of previous firm 
functions, including outsourcing, sub-contracting, joint 
ventures, and the like.  (See also Milberg 2004; Howells 1999)  
And finally, Ietto-Gillies reintroduces the subject of the 
hierarchical nature of the typical firm, a concept seemingly lost 
in the focus on the collective learning function of the firm.   
Nolan et al. (and Milberg 2004) emphasize a “global business 
revolution,” involving a few giant corporations “dominat[ing] 
each sector of the global economy.”  Their competitive advantages 
include sizable global market shares and globally recognized 
brands based on past investments. (Nolan 91-92)  Thus Nolan 
places TNCs at the core of international oligopolistic 
competition for contested resources.  Ietto-Gillies emphasizes 
the strategic advantages internationalization extends to the TNC, 
including the learned capability to manage assets across national 
“regulatory regimes,” opening up possibilities for spreading 
risks, engaging in transfer pricing, threatening rivals, and 
gaining bargaining power relative to labor and home-country and 
host-country governments. Here, in effect, is the 
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internationalized version of Lazonick’s innovative enterprise, 
transforming its environment across national boundaries.  It is 
recognized specifically that the regulatory environment, and not 
just the economic and competitive environment, offers 
possibilities for transformation of constraints.  National and 
supra-national governance institutions are therefore targets for 
TNC influence in the effort to control resources.  This 
connection between TNCs and governance institutions is a concept 
acknowledged in the international political economy (IPE) and 
business literatures, but mostly absent from the economics-based 
theoretical TNC literature (with exceptions, such as Sugden 
____).  Yet, influence over regulatory policy extends the TNC’s 
influence on resource allocation in a way not recognized in the 
theory of the firm, and with genuine economic consequences.  The 
push to extend American intellectual property rights conventions 
around the globe is just one example (Perelman 2003; Doshi 2004); 
the broader effort to standardize international rules regarding 
trade and investment is another.  
Nolan and Ietto-Gillies also recognize the ongoing  
externalization of many non-core firm functions, further 
destroying the coincidence of ownership boundaries with the power 
to influence resource allocation.  One example is the Dell 
company, which “exercises considerable administrative control 
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over stages of production it does not own.” (Langlois 2003: 376) 
 The literature is full of similar examples.  (See, e.g., Howells 
1999; Azoulay 2004)  Nolan refers to the “external firm” as “the 
sphere over which conscious coordination of resource allocation 
takes place….”(101)  While the focus on the “external firm” 
questions the amount of theoretical attention paid to ownership 
boundaries, this does not mean that there is no value in 
investigating the determinants of those boundaries.  In fact, it 
is possible to explain the ownership boundaries, externalization, 
and the TNC’s relationship with labor by focusing more closely on 
the process of standardization as a part of the process of 
innovation. 
According to Nolan et al., externalization occurs because 
new information technology investments have made “super-
increased” monitoring possible.  Like Lazonick, Nolan emphasizes 
that firms have worked to transform their pre-existing 
constraints (transactions-related or otherwise).  This renders 
ownership of some foreign productive activities an unnecessarily 
invested way to control economic activities in which they have an 
interest.  Milberg (2004) has examined the pattern of vertical 
disintegration of production resulting from the outsourcing of 
supplier functions in sub-industries that utilize standardized 
technologies not core to the outsourcing firm.  These sub-
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industries are subject to vigorous competition and experience low 
profit margins. These conditions are likely to exist in 
productive activities utilizing relatively non-unique assets and 
standardized production methods, which are the source of the 
competitive and profit conditions.   
Milberg emphasizes that firms retain ownership of unique 
assets/activities because of their rent-producing properties.  
Nolan focuses on the monitorability of outsourced functions.  
(See also Azoulay 2004; Howells 1999)  The two are part of a 
continuum of innovatory activities.  What renders a technology 
“standardized,” and no longer unique and inimitable, no longer a 
source of rents, with more easily measured output quality?  
Introducing the dynamic element, the process of standardization 
is the process of refining know-how until the once tacit 
understanding involved becomes familiar, routine and accessible 
to many.  This is the result of past investments made by firms to 
make the technology and its utilization more reliable, and 
therefore easier to manage, along with investments in new 
measurement tools.  These investments contribute to the creation 
of new markets supplying functions not previously obtainable 
outside the firm’s ownership boundaries.  Externalization of 
standardized functions may be said to be due to low transaction 
costs in markets for easily measurable activities, but the 
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transaction costs are endogenously determined by firms’ 
competitive investments in innovation and standardization. (see 
Milberg 2004:61; see also Langlois 2003)  These principles can 
also help to explain the hierarchical division of labor within 
the firm that Ietto-Gilies re-introduces.   
The cooperative learning approach to the firm seemed to have 
abandoned attention to the typical hierarchical nature of the 
firm until Ietto-Gillies cited the motive to subdue labor 
bargaining power as one driver of international production.  
Lazonick had also cautioned that the collective, developmental 
approach to the firm is typically limited to the managerial 
group, at least in the United States, except perhaps in narrow, 
skill-based industries such as information technology.  In TNCs 
originating outside the U.S., the extent of the collective 
learning approach may vary.   
The network literature suggests a method for characterizing 
the hierarchy of labor within the firm, and that is to employ the 
subjective judgment/measurement differentiation.  Azoulay (2004) 
and Howells (1999) address the distinction between research labor 
within the firm and labor in outsourced research functions.  
Howells suggests a “core and periphery” workforce, with sub-
contracting for routine, standardized low value-added work, and 
in-house labor devoted to the firm’s “critical” technology, i.e., 
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labor whose performance requires appraisal or judgment since no 
objective measurements are available. (pp. 22-25)  (Hodgson 1998 
also emphasizes judgment.)  Azoulay (2004) emphasizes the 
difference between easily monitorable tasks performed in “data 
sweatshops” by “data mules” and knowledge production: “the 
establishment of novel conceptual categories, hypotheses, and 
causal associations.” (1591)  The latter is harder to measure, 
resulting in subjective performance evaluations. 
 
Extending these concepts to the division of labor within the 
firm, labor whose performance is judged, not measured, based on a 
variety of changing interrelated factors, is more likely to be a 
part of the learning/developing group.  Labor whose performance 
is more easily measured using standardized tools and considered 
to be more easily replaceable is less likely to be in the 
development group because the firm invests relatively little 
firm-specific knowledge in this group.  This is also the labor 
more likely to be outsourced if and when markets are created in 
the services provided by this labor.  In other words, there may 
be within the firm a continuum of activities differentiable on 
the basis of the degree to which performance can be measured 
objectively.  If and when activities are outsourced is a matter 
of technological and institutional development that results from 
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firms’ competitive investments.  Using the same analytical method 
to address the division of labor within and outside the firm’s 
boundaries emphasizes the hierarchy that exists within both firms 
and markets. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: what do TNCs do?   
 What do (firms) TNCs do?  They produce goods and services in 
more than one country for anticipated profitable remuneration.  
They compete in order to remove threats and enhance their 
capabilities for continuing to produce and sell, using 
innovation, the acquisition of appropriate finance and other 
resources and the securing of necessary supplies (which may or 
may not include a market interface).  In this competitive 
process, they transform themselves, markets, the nature and 
location of production, and the environment, including political 
institutions and governance.  The anticipation of remuneration or 
rents comes from branding and differentiated and somewhat 
inimitable knowledge or capabilities which can be developed and 
supplemented over time through the production, selling, and 
resource acquisition experience.  The choice of location of 
production, and whether resources are owned or contracted, is a 
strategic issue, which of necessity changes with historical 
changes in firms, technology and the evolution of markets and the 
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competitive environment.  Ietto-Gillies argues that the choice of 
network configurations, i.e., the network that includes the 
firm’s owned assets and contracted assets, depends on “strategic 
objective, efficiency constraints and perceived scope for 
control.” (2002B: 40; see also Lazonick on strategic control: 
252)  Some competitive methods may improve efficiency, but others 
will secure the basis for collecting rents by extending 
proprietary control.   
 The international scope brings access to unique foreign 
resources that may be folded into the firm’s existing competitive 
advantages.  It extends the reach of the TNC’s control over a 
portion of global resources, thus limiting control by others with 
different goals, including rivals, governing bodies and labor.  
Ownership-based control is unlikely when the foreign assets are 
not unique enough to yield significant rents or would unduly 
raise risk by concentrating too many of the firm’s resources on a 
single competitive opportunity.  Here, subcontracting or 
outsourcing suffices to extend control over non-owned resources. 
 TCE focuses attention on a subset of competitive tools in 
unique circumstances.  Knowledge-based theories, to the extent 
that they adopt transaction-cost reasoning to explain ownership 
of foreign production, are subject to the same problem.  
Transaction costs are undoubtedly an important consideration, one 
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among many, with regard to multinational expansion.   
The knowledge-based literature, when freed of the 
constraints of the TCE methodology, demonstrates more clearly 
that there are many possible reasons to operate internationally. 
 They add to the fleshing out of the institutional 
characteristics of the firm and the TNC and of the nature and 
process of competition.  They are more likely to focus on the 
dynamic development of competitive advantages instead of simply 
the transfer of advantages.  They are more likely to help to take 
analysis of the TNC out of the static, constrained-optimization 
methodology that draws attention away from the competitive 
activities that transform the global environment. 
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i In the literature on this topic, no distinction is made between the firm and 
the specifically corporate form.  I follow that practice here, noting the 
additional privileges accruing to the corporation due to limited liability and 
less costly access to finance.  
ii I use the term TNC interchangeably with multinational corporation (MNC), 
multinational enterprise (MNE) and international firm, as is the usual 
practice. 
iii As Langlois (2003) notes, the distinction between markets and hierarchies 
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has become dated since 1937. The differences between firms and markets can not 
be characterized so starkly along the hierarchy dimension.  This point is 
addressed in the conclusion of this paper. 
ivHymer’s 1960 dissertation was published in 1976. 
 
vSuccessful foreign production would entail learning costs with 
respect to a foreign culture, laws, regulation, and language, and 
local firms would have the advantage of already knowing how to 
conduct business in this environment (Hymer 1976: 28, 34). 
 
vi Dunning created a “framework” for understanding international production as 
a function of a firm’s Ownership advantages (often intangible assets), 
Location advantages, and Internalization advantages. 
viiHymer believed that integration of "previously remote markets" 
would improve the efficiency of global resource allocation (Hymer 
1976: 221).  Kindleberger (1969) developed this theme at more 
length (pp. 32, 187). 
 
viiiviiiMost of Williamson's (1981) article is devoted to the 
argument that the modern M-form of corporate organization evolved 
in order to minimize transaction costs that arise from 
circumstances characterized by bounded rationality and 
opportunism.  He argues that the M-form made the TNC possible by 
reducing the information management burden at the 
planning/strategic level of the firm. 
 
ix A great deal of work on the TNC has focused on the so-called “hold-up” 
problem that could occur when a party to a contract makes investments in 
specialized assets that have little market value outside the contract.  See 
Holmstrom 1998.  
xDunning has proposed the OLI paradigm to explain the level and 
pattern of international production.  In each case, the firm 
instituting foreign production must possess an "Ownership" or 
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competitive advantage such as a patent; the country that provides 
the site must offer some "Location advantage," such as unique 
resources or an attractive market (requiring localized production); 
and the firm's advantage is of a type best exploited by 
"Internalizing" production within the firm.  See, e.g., Dunning 
1993: 81. 
 
xi An exception is John Cantwell’s (1991) work on the theory of technological 
accumulation. 
xii Indeed, Waldman and Jensen (2001) note research showing that managers rank 
secrecy above patenting as the preferred method for maintaining this exclusive 
access.  
xiii He notes, however, that Penrose saw no need for a separate 
theory of the TNC since she saw geographical diversification as 
just one part of the firm diversification that accompanies growth. 
The establishment of foreign subsidiaries or branches is, for the parent 
company, not essentially different from the establishment of subsidiaries or 
branches in its own country.  To be sure, greater allowance for risk must be 
made,….  But the new expansion is part of the process of growth of the parent 
company….  (Kay 2000:144; Penrose 1956:225-26).   
xiv Kogut and Zander base their work on the evolutionary approach to the firm 
developed by Nelson and Winter (1982). 
xv It is not entirely clear how a firm without these capabilities can achieve 
better transfer results through market intermediation.  Perhaps the default 
option is no transfer at all.   
xvi Lazonick updates Penrose by describing how the evolution of the US stock 
market over the last few decades and the role of stock options in corporate 
governance have destroyed the social conditions favoring organizational 
integration in the US that was typical of industrial enterprises when Penrose 
was writing her book.  Lazonick recognizes the ability of firms based on 
“’narrow and concentrated’ skill bases of highly educated and specialized 
personnel,” such as the pharmaceutical industry, to achieve organizational 
integration. (p. 271) 
 
 
